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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Kars 4 Kids, Inc. (“Kars 4 Kids”) and America Can! 
Cars for Kids (“America Can”) used similar trademarks.  Each 
sued the other, alleging violations of state and federal law 
related to the use of those marks.  Because (1) America Can 
did not preserve its challenge to the District Court’s denial of 
summary judgment on its trademark cancelation claims, (2) 
5 
 
America Can was first to use its mark in Texas and Kars 4 Kids 
has waived any challenge to the validity of America Can’s 
marks, and (3) the District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
declining to award enhanced monetary relief or prejudgment 
interest, we will affirm in part.  We will, however, vacate in 
part and remand for the District Court to reexamine its laches 






 America Can and Kars 4 Kids are charities that sell 
donated vehicles to fund children’s programs.  America Can 
began receiving donations in the late 1980s and, in the early 
1990s, began using the mark “Cars for Kids” in advertising 
campaigns.  Its campaigns included between two and five radio 
advertisements per week by Bonnie Curry, a radio personality 
whose programs reached up to one million people in the Dallas 
area.  Curry’s advertisements began in 1993 and have 
continued “pretty consistent[ly]” since then.  App. 2135.  
Between 1995 and 2001, America Can also advertised in the 
Dallas Morning News, which published several articles 
discussing the “Cars for Kids” program.   
 
Kars 4 Kids was founded in 1995, and it has used its 
marks in its advertising since at least 1997.  Kars 4 Kids first 
used “flyers and bumper stickers,” App. 1975, then distributed 
nationwide mailers.  In the early 2000s, Kars 4 Kids began 
advertising in regional newspapers and national Jewish 
publications.  In 1999, Kars 4 Kids started using a musical 
jingle in its radio and television advertisements.  In 2003, Kars 
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4 Kids began advertising in online magazines and purchased 
keyword advertisements on Yahoo and Google.   
 In 2003, America Can noticed Kars 4 Kids’ 
advertisements in Texas and sent a cease and desist letter, 
asserting America Can’s rights to the “Cars for Kids” mark in 
Texas.  After sending that letter, America Can did not notice 
Kars 4 Kids’ advertisements in Texas for several years.  Kars 
4 Kids, however, kept advertising.1  For example, in 2005, Kars 
4 Kids advertised nationally in Reader’s Digest.  It also used 
Google advertising, which allowed Kars 4 Kids’ 
advertisements to appear nationwide—including in Texas—
when potential donors used certain search terms.  In 2011, Kars 
4 Kids procured the URL www.carsforkids.com, which it 
initially used to solicit donations.2    By 2011, America Can 
began seeing Kars 4 Kids advertisements and, in 2013, sent 
 
1 During this period, America Can received 
communications from at least one confused donor but the 
record does not reveal whether the donor was based in Texas.  
2 Kars 4 Kids stopped using the URL and “parked” the 
domain, meaning it is no longer “redirected to a live webpage.”  
App. 3122.  According to America Can, the parked domain 
both benefited and harmed it.  On the one hand, America Can 
could “continue to get some of the donations [when its] donors 
[were] looking for [its] name, and Kars 4 Kids . . . [would not 
have been] getting them.”  App. 3125.  In fact, after Kars 4 
Kids parked the domain, America Can’s “donations in 
specifically Dallas and Houston, picked up significantly.”  
App. 3122.  On the other hand, “if somebody [went] to find 
[America Can] and [found the] name at a website that [was] 
down . . . they’re going to look at [America Can] as 




Kars 4 Kids another cease and desist letter, alleging that Kars 
4 Kids was unlawfully using “KARS 4 KIDS” in Texas.   
B 
 
 Kars 4 Kids sued America Can in 2014, bringing federal 
and state trademark infringement, unfair competition, and 
trademark dilution claims, and seeking equitable relief.  
America Can filed its suit in 2015, asserting the same claims 
and seeking cancelation of Kars 4 Kids’ trademark for 1-877-
KARS-4-KIDS under 15 U.S.C. § 1119, financial 
compensation, and a nationwide injunction prohibiting Kars 4 
Kids from using the mark. 
 
 The District Court denied the parties’ cross-motions for 
summary judgment, including America Can’s request for mark 
cancelation, “[d]ue to the disputed facts with regard to the 
trademark in this matter.”3  Kars 4 Kids Inc. v. America Can!, 
 
3 America Can has not preserved its challenge to this 
order.  “[W]hen a legal issue initially raised at summary 
judgment . . . depends on the resolution of factual questions, 
motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rules 50(a) and 
(b) are . . . required to preserve the legal issue for appellate 
review.”  Frank C. Pollara Grp., LLC v. Ocean View Inv. 
Holding, LLC, 784 F.3d 177, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2015).  
 Under 15 U.S.C. § 1119, district courts may “order the 
cancelation of registrations, in whole or in part.”  One basis for 
cancelation is fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”).  15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(3), 1119.  A trademark applicant 
commits fraud under the Lanham Act when he knowingly 
makes false, material representations of fact in connection with 
an application for a registered mark.  See Sovereign Mil. 
Hospitaller Ord. of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes & of 
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No. 14-cv-7770, 2018 WL 5298406, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 
2018).   
 
 Before the liability trial, the District Court determined 
that America Can’s request for damages equal to Kars 4 Kids’ 
profits was “plainly a claim for disgorgement of profits, and 
not a claim for America Can[]’s own damages.”  Kars 4 Kids 
Inc. v. America Can!, No. 3:14-cv-7770, 2019 WL 2078670, 
at *2 (D.N.J. May 10, 2019).  Because disgorgement is an 
equitable remedy, the Court granted Kars 4 Kids’ motion to 
present disgorgement evidence at a bench trial, if necessary, 
following the jury’s verdict on liability.  Id. at *2-3. 
 
Following the close of evidence to the jury, both parties 
moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 50(a).  Kars 4 Kids argued, among other 
things, that “America Can[] failed to demonstrate that it has 
 
Malta v. Fla. Priory of Knights Hospitallers of Sovereign Ord. 
of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, Ecumenical Ord., 
702 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2012).  Succeeding on a fraud 
claim requires showing by clear and convincing evidence that 
the applicant intended to deceive the PTO when applying for 
the mark.  In re Bose Corp., 580 F.3d 1240, 1243, 1245 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
The District Court correctly determined that the 
cancelation claim required resolving a factual question: 
whether Kars 4 Kids was truthful when applying to register its 
mark.  Because this requires resolution of disputed facts and 
America Can failed to renew its challenge in its motion for 
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a), it has waived its 
ability to seek review of the summary judgment order denying 
its cancelation claim. 
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ownership and priority” of the mark, App. 2293, but did not 
argue that America Can’s mark is invalid.  The District Court 
reserved judgment on those motions.  The jury then found that 
America Can had trademark rights and that Kars 4 Kids 
willfully infringed those rights in Texas.  The jury also found 
neither party proved their trademark dilution claims and that 
America Can failed to prove that Kars 4 Kids had obtained 
registration of its 1-877-KARS-4-KIDS mark by false 
representations.  Furthermore, as the District Court observed, 
the jury returned no verdict on any state law claim.4 
 
The District Court then held a bench trial on the 
equitable claims and remedies.  The Court held that the defense 
of laches did not apply, finding America Can’s executive 
credibly testified that he did not see Kars 4 Kids’ 
advertisements in Texas from 2004 to 2011 and that Kars 4 
Kids seemed to have “pulled back their advertising” following 
America Can’s 2003 cease and desist letter.  Kars 4 Kids Inc. 
v. America Can!, No. 3:14-cv-7770, 2020 WL 1550804, at *4 
(D.N.J. Apr. 1 2020).  The Court found that this lack of 
advertising “lulled America Can[] into a passive position until 
2011” and “preclude[d] a finding of inexcusable delay.”  Id.  
The Court also found that Kars 4 Kids tried to “unscrupulously 
apply” laches “[b]y waiting to tee-up its laches defense until 
the remedy stage after litigating for four years.” Id.  The Court 
also stated, without explanation, that Kars 4 Kids did not 
“show any prejudice” from America Can’s alleged delay.  Id.   
 
After concluding that laches did not apply, the District 
Court ordered Kars 4 Kids to disgorge its profits in Texas.  To 
arrive at the disgorgement amount, the Court first examined 
 
4 No party appealed this finding. 
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Kars 4 Kids’ “gross and net revenues from the donations 
generated by the sale of vehicles originating from Texas.”  Id. 
at *5.  For the years 2008-2019, the parties agreed that the gross 
revenue was $18,454,452 and net revenue was $16,067,943.  
The Court deducted $3,447,191 in Texas-specific advertising 
expenses, $362,210 in national advertising expenses, and 
$1,011,000 in expenses related to compensation and office 
expenses, and ultimately ordered Kars 4 Kids to disgorge 
$10,637,135.5   
 
The District Court declined to award enhanced 
monetary relief because (1) “Kars 4 Kids willfully infringed 
upon America Can[]’s mark in Texas only; but not in any other 
state,” and (2) “the jury found no fraud in procuring Kars 4 
Kids[’] trademark.”  Id. at *9.  The Court also explained that, 
because the case was not “exceptional” under the Lanham Act, 
America Can was not entitled to attorneys’ fees or prejudgment 
interest.  App. 83. 
 
 The District Court enjoined Kars 4 Kids from using its 
mark in Texas and from using www.carsforkids.com.  The 
Court explained that “[d]ue to consumers’ confusion . . . and 
the parked domain issues . . . compensatory damages are 
insufficient, and thus some injunctive relief is necessary to 
distinguish these charitable corporations.”  Id. at *12.  The 
Court declined to cancel Kars 4 Kids’ registered mark, 
however, because “the jury determined that Kars 4 Kids did not 
knowingly procure its registration of the 1-877-Kars-4-Kids 
trademark by false or fraudulent means, which suggests that 
 




the jury found that the mark should not be cancelled.”  Id. at 
*13. 
 Kars 4 Kids renewed its motion for judgment as a matter 
of law under Rule 50(b), arguing, among other things, that 
America Can’s mark is invalid.  The District Court held that 
Kars 4 Kids preserved its invalidity argument, finding “some 
interconnectedness” between the validity argument in its Rule 
50(b) motion and the ownership argument it presented in its 
Rule 50(a) motion.  App. 127.  Still, the Court found that there 
was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found 
the mark was either distinctive, or that it established secondary 
meaning.   
 






“[T]o win a trademark claim, a plaintiff must establish 
that (1) the marks are valid and legally protectable; (2) the 
marks are owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant’s use 
of the marks to identify goods or services is likely to create 
confusion concerning the origin of the goods or services.”7  
Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 
 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1338(a).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  
7 Kars 4 Kids wisely does not argue that America Can 
failed to establish likelihood of confusion given the evidence 
of customer confusion and diverted donations.  Notably, 
America Can benefited from the same confusion.   
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187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990).  Ruling on Kars 4 Kids’ motion for 
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), the District 
Court held that the jury reasonably found that America Can 
owns a valid trademark in Texas.8   
 
We agree that America Can owns the mark, but, unlike 
the District Court, conclude that Kars 4 Kids failed to preserve 
its challenge to the validity of that mark.9  As a result, Kars 4 
Kids’ effort to overturn the jury’s liability verdict fails. 
 
8 “We exercise plenary review of an order granting or 
denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law and apply the 
same standard as the district court.”  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. 
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).  “Such a motion 
should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage 
of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient 
evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.”  
Id.  When evaluating “whether the evidence is sufficient to 
sustain liability, the court may not weigh the evidence, 
determine the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its version 
of the facts for the jury’s version.”  Id.  “The question is not 
whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party 
against whom the motion is directed but whether there is 
evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for 
that party.”  Jaasma v. Shell Oil Co., 412 F.3d 501, 503 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 
9 We review a district court’s determination whether a 
party waived an argument by failing to raise it earlier in the 
proceedings for abuse of discretion.  See Seed Co. v. 
Westerman, Hattori, Daniels & Adrian, LLP, 961 F.3d 1190, 
1195 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“We conclude that the appropriate 





 First, America Can owns its unregistered mark.  To 
determine rightful ownership of an unregistered mark, we 
generally apply “[t]he first use test . . . , taking account of the 
well-established common law principle of ‘first-in-time, first-
in-right’ that rewards actual and continuous use in commerce 
as between market competitors.”  Covertech Fabricating, Inc. 
v. TVM Bldg. Prods., Inc., 855 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2017).  
Thus, “[w]ith respect to ownership of an unregistered mark, the 
first party to adopt a mark can assert ownership so long as it 
continuously uses the mark in commerce.”  Com. Nat’l Ins. 
Servs., Inc. v. Com. Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 438 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 
 
Kars 4 Kids does not dispute that it started using its 
mark in Texas in 2003 and the evidence shows America Can 
continuously used its mark before 2003.  For instance, Bonnie 
Curry testified that she has performed between two and five 
advertisements per week for America Can beginning in 1993 
and has done so “pretty consistent[ly]” since then.  App. 2135.  
She testified that America Can used “Cars for Kids . . . in the 
early days,” App. 2144, and that when she talks about “what 
they do, it’s always been part and parcel of that process.  The 
 
party waived a substantive claim] is for abuse of discretion.”); 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 886 
F.3d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2018) (“We review for abuse of 
discretion a district court’s decision that a party did not waive 
an argument by failing to raise it earlier in the proceedings.”); 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1187 
(9th Cir. 2016) (“A district court’s determination that a party 
waived an issue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”). 
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Can Academies change lives.  And to make that happen, you 
give to Cars for Kids.”  App. 2141.  Cheryl Podrugach, 
America Can’s former public relations manager, further 
testified that Grant East, founder of America Can’s 
predecessor, “came up with” Cars for Kids “in the early []90s,” 
App. 2148, recalled America Can advertisements using the 
mark during that period, and explained that America Can’s use 
of the mark was in “full force” when she was hired in 2002 and 
that America Can was still using the mark in its advertisements 
when she began working with the car donation program in 
2007.  App. 2153.  Finally, Malcolm Wentworth, America 
Can’s Chief Operating Officer, testified about various America 
Can advertisements using the phrase “Cars for Kids.”  For 
instance, between 1995 and 2001, the Dallas Morning News 
published several articles discussing the “Cars for Kids” 
program.  Based on that evidence, the jury reasonably found 
that America Can had established continuous use prior to 2003 




Kars 4 Kids argues that America Can’s mark is invalid 
because it is descriptive and had not established secondary 
meaning before Kars 4 Kids’ first use in Texas.  Kars 4 Kids, 
however, waived this argument by failing to present it in its 
Rule 50(a) motion. 
 
 “[A] post-trial Rule 50 motion can only be made on 
grounds specifically advanced in a motion for a directed 
verdict at the end of plaintiff’s case. . . . .”  Kutner Buick, Inc. 
v. Am. Motors Corp., 868 F.2d 614, 617 (3d Cir. 1989); see 
also Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 571-72 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(“[A] defendant’s failure to raise an issue in a Rule 50(a)(2) 
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motion with sufficient specificity to put the plaintiffs on notice 
waives the defendant’s right to raise the issue in [its] Rule 
50(b) motion.”).  In its Rule 50(a) motion, Kars 4 Kids argued 
that “America Can[] failed to demonstrate that it has ownership 
and priority” of the mark.  App. 2293.  Based on that argument, 
and viewing “some interconnectedness” between validity and 
ownership of a mark, the District Court determined that Kars 4 
Kids had not waived the validity arguments made in its Rule 
50(b) motion.  App. 127.  Validity and ownership, however, 
are distinct.  See Opticians Ass’n of Am., 920 F.2d at 192 
(noting validity and ownership are separate elements of a 
trademark infringement claim).  Each element requires 
different showings.  Validity turns on whether a mark is 
inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning, see 
Parks LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 863 F.3d 220, 230 (3d Cir. 
2017) (“A valid and legally protectable mark must be 
‘distinctive,’” meaning it is “inherently distinctive” or acquired 
“secondary meaning”), while ownership turns on which party 
established “first use,” see Covertech, 855 F.3d at 170 (“The 
first use test is generally proper [to determine ownership of] 
unregistered trademarks. . . . .”).  Because Kars 4 Kids 
presented no arguments on the validity of the mark in its Rule 
50(a) motion, the District Court abused its discretion when it 
concluded that Kars 4 Kids had not waived its validity 
arguments.  Because Kars 4 Kids waived its validity challenge 
to America Can’s mark, we will not review Kars 4 Kids’ 
validity arguments or its related concurrent use or source-




 Following a bench trial on remedies, the District Court 
declined to apply laches and ordered Kars 4 Kids to disgorge 
16 
 
profits tied to its Texas activities.  The Court also held that 
neither enhanced monetary relief nor prejudgment interest 
were warranted.  With respect to laches and disgorgement, we 
will remand for the District Court to reexamine these issues 
under the governing law.  With respect to enhanced damages 
and prejudgment interest, however, we conclude the Court 




The Lanham Act does not contain a statute of 
limitations and instead subjects all claims to “the principles of 
equity,” such as laches.  Santana Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick 
Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d 123, 135 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)).  To determine whether laches 
bars a claim, we consider two elements: (1) the plaintiff’s 
“inexcusable delay in bringing suit,” and (2) “prejudice to the 
defendant as a result of the delay.”  Id. at 138.  To determine 
which party bears the burden of proof for a laches claim, courts 
first identify “the most analogous statute of limitation as a 
guideline,” id. at 135, and then consider whether that period 
has expired.  If the period has expired, then the defendant 
“enjoys the benefit of a presumption of inexcusable delay and 
prejudice,” and the plaintiff “carrie[s] the burden of proving 
that its delay was excusable and that [the delay] did not 
prejudice [the defendant].”  Id. at 138-39 (emphasis omitted) 
(citation omitted).   
 
 
10 “Because laches is an equitable doctrine, we review 
the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion.”  Tracinda 




The parties agree that “[c]laims under the Lanham Act 
are properly analogized to New Jersey’s six year fraud statute.”  
Kaufhold v. Caiafa, 872 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379 (D.N.J. 2012).  
Because America Can first discovered Kars 4 Kids’ allegedly 
wrongful conduct in 2003 and did not bring its counterclaims 
until 2015, the statute of limitations had run on America Can’s 
claims.11  Accordingly, America Can bears the burden of 
disproving delay and prejudice.  See Santana, 401 F.3d at 138-
39.12 
 
11 The District Court appears to have found that the 2011 
website registration constituted a new act of infringement that 
was not barred under the six-year limitations period, and so the 
presumption did not apply.  While many alleged Lanham Act 
violations “are ongoing,” at least one of our sister circuits has 
recognized that “the presumption of laches is triggered if any 
part of the claimed wrongful conduct occurred beyond the 
limitations period.”  Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, 
Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 2002). 
12 Contrary to America Can’s assertions, Kars 4 Kids 
did not waive the laches defense because Kars 4 Kids raised it 
in its answer, in the final pretrial order, in its trial brief, and at 
trial.  Cf. Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 
1153, 1160 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that, although the 
defendant raised a statute of limitations defense in its answer, 
it waived the defense because “it did not file a motion or 
present argument before the district court on [that] issue at any 
time before or at the trial”). 
Aside from reiterating this waiver argument, America 
Can also urges us to affirm the District Court’s laches analysis 
on two alternative grounds.  It first paints Kars 4 Kids as an 




Appellee Br. at 52; cf. Anheuser-Busch v. Du Bois Brewing, 
175 F.2d 370, 374 (3d Cir. 1949) (noting that “a fraudulent 
infringer cannot expect tender mercy of a court of equity”).  In 
making this argument, America Can relies on the jury’s finding 
that Kars 4 Kids willfully infringed.  Kars 4 Kids retorts that 
the jury instructions here allowed the jury to identify 
willfulness based on recklessness alone, not intent.  The 
District Court stated that the conduct was “willful,” but did not 
say whether it reached this conclusion because it found that 
Kars 4 Kids was a knowing infringer or reckless infringer.  
Because the District Court will be revisiting its laches analysis, 
we leave it to the Court to decide whether Kars 4 Kids counts 
as a knowing infringer and whether its finding impacts its 
laches analysis.  America Can also insists that Kars 4 Kids has 
unclean hands because it waited almost as long as America Can 
before filing suit.  We also leave it to the District Court to 
determine whether the equities of the case outweigh any 
finding of delay or prejudice.  See, e.g., Waddell v. Small Tube 
Prods., 799 F.2d 69, 79 (3d Cir. 1986); see also A.C. 
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 
1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Where there is evidence of other 
factors which would make it inequitable to recognize the 
defense despite undue delay and prejudice, the defense may be 
denied.”); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 
492, 497 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.) (“[W]here both sides 
failed to press their claims after knowledge of the facts, this 
Court has reached the conclusion, seemingly far more sensible, 





 A plaintiff is not obligated to sue until it knows or 
should know that the defendant’s conduct constitutes 
trademark infringement.  See, e.g., Excelled Sheepskin & 
Leather Coat Corp. v. Or. Brewing Co., 897 F.3d 413, 419 (2d 
Cir. 2018) (“The laches clock begins to run when the trademark 
owner knew or should have known, not simply that [the 
infringer] was using the potentially offending mark, but that 
[it] had a provable infringement claim against [the infringer].” 
(quotation marks and citation omitted)); Oriental Fin. Grp., 
Inc. v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Oriental, 698 F.3d 9, 
21 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[L]aches applies only where the plaintiff 
knew or should have known of the infringing conduct.”); cf. 
Covertech, 855 F.3d at 175-76 (noting that “the relevant date 
for quantifying the ‘delay’ [for purposes of applying the 
acquiescence defense] is when the trademark owner either 
knew or should have known of the existence of a provable 
claim of infringement”).  Thus, we examine delay based upon 
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would 
have waited to file suit.  See Claussen v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 
275 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1960).   
 
In examining the delay element, the District Court 
focused exclusively on the evidence of activity America Can 
observed or did not observe in Texas.  Based on that evidence, 
the Court concluded that Kars 4 Kids’ apparent inactivity in 
Texas, as demonstrated by the lack of observed advertisements 
in Texas and the minimal amount of advertising directed into 
Texas, lulled America Can into believing the 2003 cease and 
desist letter was effective and Kars 4 Kids “pulled back [its 
Texas] advertising.”  Kars 4 Kids Inc., 2020 WL 1550804, at 
*4.  These observations, however, did not account for Kars 4 
Kids’ national advertising and whether those advertisements 
reached Texas.  Those considerations are relevant because the 
20 
 
delay inquiry hinges on whether a reasonable entity in America 
Can’s shoes would have filed suit sooner.  We will therefore 
remand to allow the District Court to consider the evidence of 
this national activity and whether it nevertheless excused 
America Can’s delay in filing suit.  See Univ. of Pittsburgh v. 
Champion Prods. Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1044 n.14 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(“Open and notorious use by the defendant is relevant to the 
plaintiff’s knowledge and, thus, whether its delay is 
excusable.”).  The District Court should also explain whether 





13 In addressing the prejudice element, the District Court 
stated that Kars 4 Kids “cannot show prejudice” but did not 
explain the basis for its conclusion.  App. 74.  As a general rule, 
a plaintiff must disprove both delay and prejudice to avoid the 
laches defense when the analogous statute of limitations has 
run.  See Santana, 401 F.3d at 138-39.  America Can argues 
that Kars 4 Kids was not prejudiced because, as a recipient of 
a cease and desist letter, it assumed the risk that, if it continued 
using the mark, subsequent investments in the mark would be 
lost.  Some of our sister circuits agree with this view.  See 
Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 569 F.3d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 
2009); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc, v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 205 
(5th Cir. 1998); Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conan Pizza, Inc., 
752 F.2d 145, 151-52 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Citibank, N.A. 
v. Citibanc Grp., Inc., 724 F.2d 1540, 1546 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(concluding that a plaintiff’s claim was not barred by laches 
because “defendants knew of plaintiff’s objections but 
nevertheless proceeded to enlarge their use” of the plaintiff’s 
mark).  The District Court is free to consider these cases as 
well as any other facts in the record when it examines whether 
America Can has carried its burden to prove both that it did not 
inexcusably delay bringing suit and that Kars 4 Kids was not 
prejudiced from such a delay.  We express no opinion as to the 
proper outcome of the laches analysis on remand. 
14 Kars 4 Kids is wrong to say that the District Court’s 
evaluation of laches “infected its evaluation of the injunctive 
relief factors.”  Appellant’s Br. at 57.  First, Kars 4 Kids argues 
that America Can’s delay cuts against finding irreparable harm, 
but “trademark infringement amounts to irreparable injury as a 
matter of law.”  S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d 





 Section 35(a) of the Lanham Act provides for the 
disgorgement of an infringer’s profits, “subject to the 
principles of equity.”  15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).16  Disgorgement 
“does not follow as a matter of course upon the mere showing 
of an infringement,” and, for example, “will be denied where 
an injunction satisfies the equities of a case.”  A & H 
Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 197, 
209 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).  To 
“evaluat[e] whether equity supports disgorging the infringer’s 
profits,” we consider “(1) whether the [infringer] had the intent 
to confuse or deceive, (2) whether sales have been diverted, 
(3) the adequacy of other remedies, (4) any unreasonable delay 
by the plaintiff in asserting his rights, (5) the public interest in 
making the misconduct unprofitable, and (6) whether it is a 
case of palming off.”  Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 
 
argues that the District Court “never balanced America Can’s 
demand for an injunction against the prejudicial consequence 
of prohibiting [Kars 4 Kids] from using marks it had cultivated 
nationally for years,” Appellant’s Br. at 58, because the Court 
explicitly said that it “must balance the rights of America 
Can[], as found by the jury, against the right of Kars 4 Kids to 
advertise in all other geographic regions and states outside of 
Texas.”  App. 88.  
15 “We . . . review the District Court’s award of 
equitable remedies under section 35(a) of the Lanham Act 
under an abuse of discretion standard.”  Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. 
Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2005). 
16 “In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to 
prove defendant’s sales only; defendant must prove all 
elements of cost or deduction claimed.”  15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
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F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Quick Techs. v. Sage 
Grp. PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir. 2002)).   
 
The District Court did not consider all of these factors.17  
In fact, it focused solely on “the appropriate accounting 
methodology to determine the disgorgement of net profits,” 
Kars 4 Kids Inc., 2020 WL 1550804, at *5, which covers only 
the second Banjo Buddies factor: “whether sales have been 
diverted,” 399 F.3d at 175.18  Because the Court did not address 
the other Banjo Buddies factors and thus did not show that it 
balanced the equities, we will vacate the disgorgement order 
and remand for the Court to apply the remaining factors.  See 
4 Pillar Dynasty LLC v. N.Y. & Co., 933 F.3d 202, 214-15 (2d 
Cir. 2019) (explaining that a district court “must still balance 
equitable factors in assessing the propriety of a profits award” 
and concluding that the court adequately did so); Malack v. 
BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 745 (3d Cir. 2010) (“An 
abuse of discretion occurs if the district court’s decision rests 
upon . . . an improper application of law to fact.” (quotation 
marks omitted)); Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 
162, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that a district court abused 
its discretion in awarding disgorgement under the Lanham Act 
where “[t]he court summarily stated . . . that the equities had 
 
17 Kars 4 Kids did not waive its objection to the District 
Court’s failure to apply the Banjo Buddies factors.  It presented 
the Banjo Buddies factors in its brief in opposition to America 
Can’s request for disgorgement and addressed them in its post-
trial proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.   
18 The donations at issue here are equivalent to diverted 
sales for a for-profit entity. 
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been balanced” without “specify[ing] the equitable factors it 




 The District Court acted within its discretion when it 
declined to award enhanced monetary relief under the Lanham 
Act.  Section 1117(a) authorizes awards of “(1) defendant’s 
profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the 
costs of the action.”  15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  When an award is 
based on profits, which “is either inadequate or excessive[,] the 
court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the 
court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the 
case.”21  Id.  If the court increases the monetary award, such an 
 
19 We express no opinion as to whether application of 
the Banjo Buddies factors should lead the Court to reach a 
different result.   
20 We review a district court’s decision on whether to 
enhance damages under the Lanham Act for abuse of 
discretion.  See Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 760 F.3d 
247, 263 (2d Cir. 2014); Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 
F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). 
21 Section 1117(a) permits an award of up to treble 
damages when a party shows its own damages and an 
enhancement when an award based on the defendant’s profits 
is inadequate.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (“In assessing damages 
the court may enter judgment . . . for any sum above the amount 
found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such 
amount.  If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery 
based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may 
in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall 
find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case.”). 
25 
 
enhancement “shall constitute compensation and not a 
penalty.”  Id.; see also Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. 
A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The 
district court ought to tread lightly when deciding whether to 
award increased profits, because granting an increase could 
easily transfigure an otherwise-acceptable compensatory 
award into an impermissible punitive measure.”).  “Generally, 
actual, proven profits will adequately compensate the 
plaintiff.”  Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, 778 F.3d at 1077.  Thus, 
in most cases, when disgorging profits, “the district court 
should award actual, proven profits unless the . . . infringer 
gained more from the infringement than the [infringer’s] 
profits reflect.”  Id.; see also Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell 
Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1157 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that “the 
benchmark for making [an enhancement] determination” when 
a court disgorges a defendant’s profits “is the likely benefit 
accruing to the defendant on account of its infringement”). 
 
America Can presents no arguments why an enhanced 
award, let alone an award equal to three times Kars 4 Kids’ 
profits, is needed to fully compensate it or that such an award 
more accurately reflects Kars 4 Kids’ true profits.  Put another 
way, America Can offers no non-punitive rationale for 
enhancing the award.22  Cf. Bos. Pro. Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas 
 
22 In its brief, America Can suggests that Kars 4 Kids’ 
willful infringement alone justifies an enhanced award.  While 
“willful infringement is central,” to the decision whether to 
enhance damages, SecuraComm Consulting Inc. v. Securacom 
Inc., 166 F.3d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1999), we have not held that 
willful infringement is alone sufficient to support an enhanced 
award.  On the facts of this case, it was not an abuse of 
discretion to conclude that the evidence of Kars 4 Kids’ willful 
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Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 597 F.2d 71, 77 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(“We would be reluctant to approve increased damages 
intended solely as punishment for conduct unrelated to . . . the 
actual damages caused by [the infringement].”).  Because 
America Can has not made such a showing, and the statute 
precludes punitive enhancements, the District Court 




infringement was not itself enough to justify an enhanced 
award, particularly where both parties benefited from the 
confusion.  Cf. 4 Pillar Dynasty LLC, 933 F.3d at 214 (“Even 
when a plaintiff sustains its burden of proving willfulness, 
courts should consider not only whether an enhanced profits 
award is appropriate, but also whether the disgorgement of all 
profits attributable to the infringing product is necessary to 
achieve the desired deterrent effect.” (emphasis omitted)).   
To the extent America Can relies on deterrence as a 
basis for its request for an enhancement, it conceded at oral 
argument that deterrence is not a compensatory reason.  Oral 
Argument at 45:17-45:21.  Thus, it cannot serve as a basis for 
an enhanced award.  Cf. ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina 
Co., 913 F.2d 958, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[D]eterrence is too 
weak and too easily invoked a justification for the severe and 
often cumbersome remedy of a profits award . . . [and] alone 
cannot justify such an award.”); Getty Petroleum Corp. v. 
Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 1988) (“So 
long as its purpose is to compensate a plaintiff for its actual 
injuries—even though the award is designed to deter wrongful 
conduct—the Lanham Act remains remedial.”). 
23 “[I]n the absence of an explicit congressional 
directive, the awarding of prejudgment interest under federal 
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The District Court also properly declined to award 
America Can prejudgment interest.     
 
Section 1117 authorizes monetary awards for trademark 
infringement.  15 U.S.C. § 1117.  It “particularizes in 
considerable detail the types of monetary relief available for 
trademark infringement and defines the criteria for awarding 
each type.”  Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. von 
Drehle Corp., 781 F.3d 710, 721 (4th Cir. 2015).  As discussed 
above, § 1117(a), which applies generally to trademark 
infringement cases, and which applies here, authorizes awards 
of “(1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the 
plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.”  15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  
Section 1117(b), which applies to knowing and intentional use 
of a counterfeit mark, allows courts to also award, among other 
forms of relief, prejudgment interest.  15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). 
 
“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same 
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”  
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted).  Applying this principle, because 
§ 1117(b) allows courts to award prejudgment interest and 
§ 1117(a) does not provide for prejudgment interest, 
 
law is committed to the trial court’s discretion.”  Pignataro v. 
Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(alteration in original).  Thus, when Congress does not provide 
for prejudgment interest to a prevailing party, we review the 
District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion.  Id. 
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prejudgment interest is unavailable under § 1117(a).24  See 
Georgia-Pacific, 781 F.3d at 721-22.  Thus, the District Court 
correctly denied prejudgment interest on America Can’s 
federal trademark infringement claims. 
 
America Can is also not entitled to prejudgment interest 
under state law.  To obtain prejudgment interest on a state law 
claim, the party must prevail on that claim.  As the District 
Court observed, the “trademark infringement claims under the 
Lanham Act were the main claims in this case.”  App. 121.  The 
 
24 Two sister circuits have determined that prejudgment 
interest is presumptively available to successful plaintiffs 
under § 1117(a).  See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland 
Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1236-37 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(remanding to consider whether prejudgment interest was 
warranted and noting that “this Court has adopted a preference, 
if not a presumption, for prejudgment interest” for federal 
claims); Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Case-USA, Inc., 
874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming award of 
prejudgment interest under § 1117(a) because the “federal 
common law authorizes the award of such interest in 
appropriate cases to victims of violations of federal law”).  
Neither court, however, considered the text of § 1117 in its 
entirety, which shows Congress’s intent to make prejudgment 
interest unavailable under § 1117(a).  The Gorenstein court, for 
instance, noted that “the statute makes no reference to 
prejudgment interest,” 874 F.2d at 436, but failed to recognize 
that the next section refers to prejudgment interest.  Thus, 
because these courts overlooked this clear evidence of 
Congress’s intent, we decline to adopt their conclusion that 




Court therefore found that “the jury did not consider the unfair 
competition as a separate cause of action but instead as an 
element of the trademark infringement cause of action.”  Id.  
Because America Can did not object to these observations, it 
has forfeited any right to assert that the jury found in its favor 
on a state law claim.25  Cf. In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (deeming as forfeited arguments not developed in 
appellant’s opening brief).  Because there was no verdict in its 
favor on any state law claim, America Can has no basis to seek 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate 
in part, and remand. 
 
25 Although the jury was instructed that it need not 
“consider unfair competition separately” from the trademark 
infringement claims, D. Ct. ECF No. 29 at 118, it was not asked 
to return a verdict on the claim.  America Can neither objected 
to the instruction, id. at 106-07, nor sought a verdict on any 
state law claim. 
